Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation. In this paper I reformulate the debate in terms of the naturalness of generic truth, and discuss some notable consequences of this more careful reformulation. I show not only that some alleged solutions, like the resort to plural quantification, are ineffective, but also that the problem is not really posed by mixed inferences, as usually thought. Finally, I argue that the traditional account of logical validity does carry a commitment to generic truth, so that a strong version of alethic pluralism can hardly vindicate it.

种族多元主义认为，有许多种实现真理的方式。该观点已被指控无法对逻辑上的合法性（被认为是必要的真相保留）进行公正对待。在本文中，我根据通用真理的自然性重新制定了辩论，并讨论了这种更为谨慎的重新制定的显着后果。我不仅表明某些所谓的解决方案（例如诉诸于复数量化）是无效的，而且还表明问题并非真正像通常所认为的那样由混合推论引起。最后，我认为，逻辑有效性的传统解释确实包含了对普遍真理的承诺，因此，强大的伦理多元主义很难证明这一点。