We investigate the collusive incentive for far-sighted manufacturers selling via managerial retailers. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that revenue delegation can impede upstream collusion in Bertrand models. This happens due to market exit in the deviation phase when products are close substitutes. The result of managerial delegation hindering upstream collusion is robust if we allow manufacturers to consider partial collusion. Furthermore, we show that less intensified downstream competition does not always harm consumers. If upstream collusion is less sustainable with managerial retailers, consumers can be better-off.

中文翻译：

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管理代表团会阻碍上游勾结吗？

我们调查了有远见的制造商通过管理零售商销售产品的共谋动机。与现有文献相反，我们发现收入授权可以阻止Bertrand模型中的上游合谋。这是由于产品是紧密替代品时在偏离阶段退出市场而发生的。如果我们允许制造商考虑部分合谋，管理委派阻碍上游合谋的结果是有力的。此外，我们表明，下游竞争的加剧并不总是会损害消费者。如果上游串通与管理零售商之间的可持续性较差，则消费者的境况会更好。