The present article aims to illuminate a notion of finite freedom in both Heidegger and Levinas. Levinas criticizes the Heideggerian ontology for holding an egoistic, unconstrained notion of freedom. The article first responds to such a criticism by showing that the Heideggerian notion of freedom as self-binding involves normativity. It then argues that both Heidegger and Levinas propose a notion of finite freedom as the unity of autonomy and heteronomy. Finally, the article also sheds light on what different approaches to the source of normativity separate the two philosophers’ understandings of freedom.

中文翻译：

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自由，规范和有限：在海德格尔和列维纳斯之间

本文旨在阐明海德格尔和列维纳斯的有限自由概念。列维纳斯批评海德格尔本体论主张自由主义的利己主义。文章首先通过表明海德格尔式的自由约束作为自我约束涉及规范性来回应这种批评。然后，它认为海德格尔和列维纳斯都提出了有限自由的概念，将其视为自治与异质的统一。最后，本文还阐明了规范哲学渊源的不同方法是如何将两个哲学家的自由理解区分开来的。