We develop a contingent claim model to examine the interaction between financing and investment where equity holders decide when to default and debt holders decide when to liquidate as well as maximize the liquidation value. We show that if the debt holders maximize the residual value at liquidation, an increase in liquidation value increases the amount of debt issuance and investment quantity ex ante, delaying corporate investment. This relationship is based on the fact that an increase in the liquidation value decreases the credit spread of debt holders. These results fit well with those of existing empirical studies.

中文翻译：

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债权人最大化清算下的融资和投资策略

我们开发了一个或有债权模型来检查融资和投资之间的相互作用，其中股权持有人决定何时违约，债务持有人决定何时清算以及最大化清算价值。我们表明，如果债务持有人在清算时最大化剩余价值，清算价值的增加会增加债券发行量和事前投资数量，从而延迟企业投资。这种关系是基于这样一个事实，即清算价值的增加会降低债务持有人的信用利差。这些结果与现有实证研究的结果非常吻合。