ABSTRACT

Ceasefires are agreed in most intra-state conflicts and the majority of these agreements are violated. Yet, the subsequent dynamics of retaliation are still poorly understood. This article proposes a novel conceptual framework, describing the decision-making of conflict parties after ceasefire violations. I argue that the conflict parties face the two-fold decision-making problem of choosing a proportionate reaction: a reaction that assures their interest in the ongoing conflict and in the continuation of the agreement. When proportionate reactions are chosen, mutual compliance with the ceasefire can be re-established. The empirical implications of this framework are illustrated with evidence from two ceasefires in the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. This article advances our analytical understanding of an overlooked period during armed conflict, i.e. while a ceasefire is in place. This is critical since collapsing ceasefires can lead to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation and of the prospects for peace. More generally, this article draws the attention to the counter-intuitive function of violence to secure cooperation in intra-state conflicts.

摘要

大多数国家内部冲突都同意停火，但这些协议中的大多数都被违反了。然而，对随后的报复动态仍然知之甚少。本文提出了一个新的概念框架，描述了冲突各方在违反停火后的决策。我认为，冲突各方面临着选择适当反应的双重决策问题：一种反应，以确保他们对正在进行的冲突和协议的延续感兴趣。选择比例反应时，可以重新建立与停火的相互依从性。菲律宾棉兰老岛冲突中两次停火的证据说明了该框架的实证意义。本文促进了我们对武装冲突期间被忽视的时期（即停火到位时）的分析性理解。这一点至关重要，因为停火的崩溃会导致人道主义局势和和平前景的恶化。更一般地说，本文提请注意暴力在国家内部冲突中确保合作的反直觉功能。