In middle to late Byzantium, one finds dogmatic-style sceptical arguments employed against human reason in relation to divine revelation, where revelation becomes the sole criterion of certain truth in contrast to reason. This argumentative strategy originates in early Christian authors, especially Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215 CE) and Gregory Nazianzen (c. 329–390 CE), who maintain that revelation is the only domain of knowledge where certainty is possible. Given this, one finds two striking variations of this sceptical approach: a “mild” variant (represented by Clement), where knowledge derived from human reason admits partial access to truths manifested in revelation, if imperfect; and a “strict” variant (represented by Gregory), where knowledge derived from human reason does not admit any access to truths in revelation. This paper analyzes the three Byzantines, Nicholas of Methone (d. 1160/66 CE), Theodore Metochites (1270–1320 CE), and Gregory Palamas (1296–1357/59 CE), who each display certain tendencies toward these two “poles” in their respective epistemological positions on knowledge through reason and faith.

中文翻译：

---

12 至 14 世纪拜占庭的理性、启示和怀疑论辩

在拜占庭的中后期，人们发现在神圣启示方面，人们使用教条式的怀疑论据来反对人类理性，其中启示成为与理性相反的某些真理的唯一标准。这种争论策略起源于早期的基督教作家，尤其是亚历山大的克莱门特（约公元 150-215 年）和格雷戈里·纳齐安岑（约公元 329-390 年），他们认为启示是唯一可能确定的知识领域。鉴于此，人们发现了这种怀疑方法的两个显着变体：一种“温和”变体（由克莱门特代表），其中源自人类理性的知识允许部分获得启示中表现的真理，如果不完美的话；和一个“严格”的变体（由格雷戈里代表），其中源自人类理性的知识不允许任何访问启示中的真理。