Purpose

Amid growing attention from investors, regulators and advisory firms in recent years, this study assesses whether managers exploit private information to time share-pledge transactions and extract personal benefits while avoiding unintended market scrutiny.

Design/methodology/approach

We use hand-collected pledging data for a random sample of S&P 1500 firms to examine whether private information influences insider share-pledging activity using Heckman selection and two-part hurdle models of the pledge decision. We also conduct an event study analysis of announcement returns to measure market reactions to pledging news and determine whether share-pledge disclosures affect investor risk assessments.

Findings

Consistent with insiders timing pledges prior to anticipated performance declines, both the likelihood and level of pledging increase significantly with negative earnings surprises. New share-pledges precede significant decreases in abnormal returns, and public announcement of new pledging corresponds with significant negative cumulative abnormal returns. The evidence suggests that insiders exploit private information to time pledges, and that investors update risk assessments and value estimates based on information conveyed by these transactions.

Practical implications

Our findings hold important implications for governance and regulation of pledged shares, indicating that permissive reporting requirements in the US facilitate informed pledging and may undermine incentive alignment between managers and shareholders. The analysis promotes transaction-specific disclosures and transparent corporate policies for insider share-pledging.

Originality/value

Ours is among the first empirical analyses of share-pledging in US firms and the first to examine the role of private information in pledging decisions. We offer novel evidence on the opportunistic use of pledged shares and provide insight to predictors of share-pledging behavior.

中文翻译：

---

内部人股权质押中的信息不对称和机会主义

目的

近年来，在投资者、监管机构和咨询公司日益关注的情况下，这项研究评估了管理人员是否利用私人信息进行时间股份质押交易并获取个人利益，同时避免意外的市场审查。

设计/方法/方法

我们使用手工收集的标普 1500 公司随机样本的质押数据，使用 Heckman 选择和质押决策的两部分障碍模型来检查私人信息是否影响内部股票质押活动。我们还对公告回报进行事件研究分析，以衡量市场对质押新闻的反应，并确定股份质押披露是否影响投资者风险评估。

发现

与内部人士在预期业绩下降之前的时间承诺一致，承诺的可能性和水平都随着负面收益意外而显着增加。新的股份质押先于异常收益的显着下降，而新的股份质押的公告对应于显着的负累积异常收益。证据表明，内部人士利用私人信息进行时间承诺，投资者根据这些交易传达的信息更新风险评估和价值估计。

实际影响

我们的发现对质押股份的治理和监管具有重要意义，表明美国的宽松报告要求有助于知情质押，并可能破坏经理和股东之间的激励一致性。该分析促进了特定交易的披露和内部人股份质押的透明公司政策。

原创性/价值

我们的研究是对美国公司股份质押的首批实证分析之一，也是第一个研究私人信息在质押决策中的作用的研究。我们提供了关于机会主义使用质押股份的新证据，并为股份质押行为的预测因素提供了见解。