The information asymmetry caused by the virtual nature of the Internet is a challenge faced by FinTech innovation regulation, whereas new media participation makes the information environment more complex. From the perspective of finding a dynamic balance between innovation and regulation, this study considers reputation adjustment under new media participation, as well as the corresponding selection of an innovation path. It is found that the equilibrium strategy of an excessive innovative FinTech platform is directly related to its time preference. For platforms that pay more attention to the current interests, the high-pressure regulatory environment and public opinion supervision can effectively restrain excessive innovation, whereas for platforms that focus on long-term interests, appropriate relaxation of regulatory pressure and public opinion environment can encourage the platform to maintain its reputation by pretending to be compliant.

由互联网的虚拟性质引起的信息不对称是金融科技创新法规面临的挑战，而新媒体的参与使信息环境更加复杂。从发现创新与监管之间的动态平衡的角度出发，本研究考虑了新媒体参与下的声誉调整以及创新路径的相应选择。发现过度创新的金融科技平台的均衡策略与其时间偏好直接相关。对于更关注当前利益的平台，高压监管环境和舆论监督可以有效地抑制过度创新，而对于关注长远利益的平台，