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On the Structural Stability of Values for Cooperative Games
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-29 , DOI: 10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6
Xianghui Li , Yang Li

It is generally assumed that any set of players can form a feasible coalition for classical cooperative games. But, in fact, some players may withdraw from the current game and form a union, if this makes them better paid than proposed. Based on the principle of coalition split, this paper presents an endogenous procedure of coalition formation by levels and bargaining for payoffs simultaneously, where the unions formed in the previous step continue to negotiate with others in the next step as “individuals,” looking for maximum share of surplus by organizing themselves as a partition. The structural stability of the induced payoff configuration is discussed, using two stability criteria of core notion for cooperative games and strong equilibrium notion for noncooperative games.



中文翻译:

合作博弈价值观的结构稳定性

通常认为,任何一组玩家都可以为古典合作游戏建立一个可行的联盟。但是,实际上,如果某些球员的报酬比建议的要高,他们可能会退出当前的比赛并组建工会。基于联盟分裂的原理,本文提出了一种内在的联盟形成过程,该过程是同时进行等级划分和讨价还价的谈判,在此过程中,上一步中形成的工会继续与其他人谈判,下一步是“个体”,以寻求最大的利益。通过将自己组织为一个分区来分配剩余盈余。利用合作博弈的核心概念和非合作博弈的强均衡概念这两个稳定性标准,对诱导收益配置的结构稳定性进行了讨论。

更新日期:2021-04-29
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