Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of board capital as a corporate governance mechanism on firm performance in the context of a weak legal regime for investor protection. The study focuses on Latin America as a representative emerging market that includes a dataset of 442 firms in six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) from 2001 to 2012. We measure board capital as a composite index of directors’ educational attainment and professional experience. We find a positive relationship with differential effects between board capital and firm performance within weak firm internal governance schemes such as firms with low board independence, dual roles as firm CEOs and COBs, and low blockholder contestability. With respect to country-level governance standards, we find that improvements in the country’s regulatory quality, the rule of law, and corruption control reduce the need for firm board capital as an internal governance mechanism.

摘要

本文分析了在投资者保护法律制度薄弱的背景下，董事会资本作为一种公司治理机制对公司绩效的影响。该研究侧重于拉丁美洲作为具有代表性的新兴市场，包括 2001 年至 2012 年期间六个国家（阿根廷、巴西、智利、哥伦比亚、墨西哥和秘鲁）的 442 家公司的数据集。我们将董事会资本衡量为董事的综合指数' 教育程度和专业经验。我们发现，在董事会独立性低、公司 CEO 和 COB 双重角色以及股东可竞争性低的公司内部治理机制薄弱的情况下，董事会资本与公司绩效之间的差异效应存在正相关关系。关于国家层面的治理标准，我们发现国家监管质量的提高，