I examine a two-period duopolistic market for a durable good where firms compete in prices. Consumers are heterogeneous and can be described according to the following characteristics (i) high valuation and high search intensity; (ii) high valuation and low search intensity; (iii) low valuation and high search intensity; and (iv) low valuation and low search intensity. The market exhibits a new version of the so-called Coasian dynamics. The firms engage in intertemporal price discrimination and only consumers with high valuation and low search intensity purchase the product early. This result is based on a property which dictates that the consumers with high valuation and low search intensity are the most impatient. I call this the skimming through search property. When the difference between the high and the low valuation is small, there is positive probability that the prices in the first period are lower than the prices in the second period, so each firm may set a decreasing sequence of prices in a stochastic sense. Furthermore, when the percentage of consumers with high valuation increases, all consumers pay lower prices. This inter-consumer externality resembles the positive externality caused by an increase in market transparency.

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我考察了两个时期的双寡头垄断市场，以寻找企业在价格上竞争的耐用品。消费者是异类的，可以根据以下特征来描述：（i）高估值和高搜索强度；（ii）高估值和低搜索强度；（iii）估值低，搜寻强度高；（iv）估值低，搜寻强度低。市场展示了所谓的Coasian动力学的新版本。这些公司会进行跨期价格歧视，只有具有较高估值和较低搜索强度的消费者才能尽早购买产品。该结果基于一个属性，该属性指示具有高估值和低搜索强度的消费者最不耐烦。我称其为搜索属性的略读。当最高估值与最低估值之间的差异较小时，很有可能第一个时期的价格低于第二个时期的价格，因此从随机意义上讲，每个公司都可以设置一个递减的价格序列。此外，当具有较高估值的消费者比例增加时，所有消费者都将支付较低的价格。消费者之间的外部性类似于由市场透明度增加引起的正外部性。