Many experiments and field studies indicate that individuals have an asymmetric attitude towards gains versus losses. In this paper, we extend the canonic tournament model by assuming the workers' preferences exhibit disappointment aversion. First, we find the winning prize is first increasing and then decreasing in volatility and the losing prize shows the opposite. Furthermore, when the volatility exceeds a threshold, both the winning and losing prizes are reduced to zero. By contrast, there is no such kink for the risk aversion case. Finally, we find the piece rates always dominate rank-order tournaments when the workers are disappointment averse.

中文翻译：

---

锦标赛中的失望厌恶

许多实验和实地研究表明，个人对收益与损失的态度是不对称的。在本文中，我们通过假设工人的偏好表现出失望厌恶来扩展规范锦标赛模型。首先，我们发现获胜奖金的波动性先增加然后减少，而失败的奖金则相反。此外，当波动率超过阈值时，获胜和失败的奖金都减少到零。相比之下，风险规避案例没有这种扭结。最后，我们发现当工人厌恶失望时，计件工资总是主导排名比赛。