Economists recommend to partly redistribute gains to losers from a structural reform, which in many cases may be required for making the reform politically viable. However, taxation is distortionary. Then, it is unclear that compensatory transfers can support a Pareto-improving reform. This paper provides sufficient conditions for this to occur, despite tax distortions. In a setting where preferences are isoelastic, deregulation is implementable in a Pareto-improving way through compensatory lump-sum transfers, despite that these are financed by distortionary taxes. In a more general setting, there always exist Pareto-improving reforms but they may involve tightening regulation for some goods. I show that if demand cross-price elasticities are not be too large and that the reform is not too unbalanced, deregulation is again implementable in a Pareto-improving way. Finally, I consider counter-examples where some people earn rents associated with informational or institutional frictions, or where non homothetic preferences may make the schemes considered here not viable.

经济学家建议将结构性改革的收益部分分配给失败者，在许多情况下，使改革在政治上可行可能是必需的。但是，税收是扭曲性的。然后，不清楚补偿性转移能否支持改善帕累托的改革。尽管存在税收扭曲，但本文为发生这种情况提供了充分的条件。在偏好是等弹性的环境中，可以通过补偿性一次性总转移以帕累托改进的方式实施放松管制，尽管这些转移是由扭曲性税收资助的。在更一般的情况下，总是存在改进帕累托的改革，但可能涉及对某些商品的收紧监管。我表明，如果需求的交叉价格弹性不会太大，而改革也不会太不平衡，再次以帕累托改进的方式实施放松管制。最后，我考虑一些反例，其中一些人因信息或制度上的摩擦而赚取租金，或者非同质偏好可能使此处考虑的方案不可行。