It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.

人们普遍认为，在民主社会中，现任政府可能会使用各种手段，例如可自由支配的支出，以增加连任的机会。在潜在的预算限制（例如，巨额债务）的情况下，现任者可能会考虑其他方式。税收表现可能是一种容易受到现任者操纵选举的手段，特别是在体制框架薄弱的转型国家。对阿尔巴尼亚的调查表明，以月税收衡量的财政表现在选举前很差，尤其是在导致政治变革的选举中。在所有选举之前，我们观察到税收减少，从选举前 12 个月的 3.2 个百分点到选举前 6 个月的 4.0 个百分点不等。这意味着与其长期“自然”或平均利率相比，财政绩效下降了一半以上。此外，在“换届选举”（即导致执政党换届的选举）之前，表现的恶化要大得多，达两到三倍。在这些选举之后，财政表现有所改善。减少与选举相关的财政绩效恶化的关键是建立规则和机构监督（独立或两党），以减少税务机关的自由裁量权。财政表现有所改善。减少与选举相关的财政绩效恶化的关键是建立规则和机构监督（独立或两党），以减少税务机关的自由裁量权。财政表现有所改善。减少与选举相关的财政绩效恶化的关键是建立规则和机构监督（独立或两党），以减少税务机关的自由裁量权。