For a panel of 1880 firms across 21 countries from 2004 to 2008, the impact of firm-level and country-level governance on payout policy is consistent with the La Porta et al. (J Finance 60(1):1–33, 2000) outcome model. In weak legal regimes, dividends increase in firm-level governance. In strong legal regimes, dividends decrease in firm-level governance while share repurchases increase, substituting tax-efficient, flexible share repurchases for rigid dividends. Consistent with the outcome model, payout decreases in growth opportunities when firm-level and country-level governance are high. These results are robust to an instrumental variable approach and alternative firm-level and country-level governance measures.

从2004年到2008年，由21个国家/地区的1880家公司组成的小组，公司层面和国家层面的治理对支出政策的影响与La Porta等人一致。（J Finance 60（1）：1-33，2000）结果模型。在法律制度薄弱的情况下，公司级治理的红利增加。在强大的法律制度下，公司层面的治理中股息减少，而股票回购增加，从而以节税，灵活的股票回购代替了刚性股息。与结果模型一致，当公司和国家层面的治理水平较高时，支出减少了增长机会。这些结果对于采用工具变量方法以及替代的公司级和国家级治理措施是有力的。