ABSTRACT

This paper introduces Hume’s law (the fulcrum of the ‘is-ought’ problem of moral philosophy) into the property valuation literature, and uses it as a prism to reflect on the nature and limitations of standard valuation theory. The paper shows how a consideration of Hume’ thesis can help to clarify and solve some specific practical problems in property valuation. The opportunity presented by the subject of property valuation is, in turn, used to reflect back on Hume’s thesis itself, to show conditions under which Hume’s law may be said to be false. The paper makes important contributions both to the property valuation literature and to the literature on moral philosophy. With respect to property valuation, it proposes a change in the manner conclusions of valuations are reported, and the replacement of the notion of valuation accuracy by the wider and more socially appropriate concept of reasonableness.

摘要

本文将休谟定律（道德哲学“是应该”问题的支点）引入财产估价文献，并以此为棱镜反思标准估价理论的性质和局限性。本文展示了对休谟理论的思考如何有助于澄清和解决房地产估价中的一些具体实际问题。财产估价主题提供的机会反过来又被用来反思休谟的论点本身，以表明休谟定律可能被认为是错误的条件。这篇论文对财产估价文献和道德哲学文献都做出了重要贡献。关于财产估价，它建议改变估价结论的报告方式，