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State intervention, external spoilers, and the durability of peace agreements
International Interactions ( IF 1.226 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-26 , DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822
Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners’ level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener’s economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states’ satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace.



中文翻译:

国家干预、外部破坏者和和平协议的持久性

摘要

国内冲突期间的国家干预如何影响协议后结果的变化?虽然对国内冲突的干预是一个广泛研究的话题,但解决冲突的文献通常忽略了冲突期间的国家干预如何影响随后和平协议的持久性。在本文中,我认为国家干预者在后协议时期继续影响其战时盟友的决定和行动。自利的国家干预者可以利用他们对盟友的影响力来打破或培育和平协议提供的脆弱秩序,这取决于他们对和平协议的政策结果的满意程度。因此,我认为和平协议的持久性取决于 a) 国家干预者对协议后现状的满意程度,在多重干预的情况下,b) 国家干预者的满意度是趋同还是发散。我追踪了国家干预者对他们在协议后时期发出的经济和政治信号中的协议后现状的满意程度。我研究了 1985 年至 2004 年间签署的国家内部和平协议的持久性,发现 a) 改善国家干预者和协议后国家之间的经济和政治互动会增加和平协议的持久性,以及 b) 每个国家干预者之间的分歧与协议后国家的经济和政治互动降低了和平协议的持久性。调查结果表明,干预国对协议后现状的满意度是持久和平的主要决定因素。

更新日期:2021-04-26
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