This article uses philosopher Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice to shed light on the legal concept of the fiduciary, alongside demonstrating the wider contribution Fricker’s work can make to business ethics. Fiduciary, from the Latin fīdūcia, meaning “trust,” plays a fundamental role in all financial and business organisations: it acts as a moral safeguard of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary. The article focuses on the ethics of the fiduciary, but from a unique historical perspective, referring back to the original formulation of the fiduciary within a familial context to investigate presuppositions regarding agential capabilities, whilst also paying attention to the power mechanism embedded in the trustee–beneficiary relationship. Using Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the analysis elucidates the impact of cumulative beneficiary silencing in contemporary contexts, and the article uncovers ethical issues of an epistemological kind at the core of the fiduciary—of epistemic injustice.

本文使用哲学家米兰达·弗里克 (Miranda Fricker) 在认知不公正方面的工作来阐明受托人的法律概念，同时展示弗里克的工作对商业道德的更广泛贡献。Fiduciary，源自拉丁语fīdūcia，意思是“信任”，在所有金融和商业组织中都扮演着重要的角色：它是受托人和受益人之间关系的道德保障。文章关注受托人的伦理道德，但从独特的历史视角，回顾受托人在家庭背景下的原始表述，考察有关代理能力的预设，同时也关注嵌入在受托人中的权力机制——受益人关系。使用弗里克的先发制人的证词不公正理论，分析阐明了累积受益人沉默在当代语境中的影响，并且文章揭示了处于信托核心的认识论类型的伦理问题——认知不公正。