Reviewed by:

• Aristotle and Law: The Politics of Nomos by George Duke
• Melissa Lane

In this excellent book, drawing on previously published articles, George Duke gathers the scattered threads of Aristotle's discussions of law while defending clear stances in the various philosophical debates they have engendered. The book works within Aristotelian methodology and metaphysics, developing the view that a politeia should be understood as a formal cause (64) that is worked out in terms of the successive definitions offered in book III of Politics. Building on studies of the evolution of the meaning of nomos and making occasional reference to Greek legal history and practice, primarily in Athens, it treats what I see as three themes, spread across seven chapters.

In chapters 1 and 2, Duke addresses the place of law in Aristotle's ethics and politics, understood as exercises of practical philosophy. He argues that law enters the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics as a mechanism that includes compulsion to guide citizens who may not fully grasp the rationality that it contains. This construction of the political is, he claims, reconcilable with the "political naturalism" (14, 54, and passim) of Politics I, so long as human nature is itself understood as containing the potential to exercise practical reason, something perfected in the "architectonic legislator" (9, 11, and passim). [End Page 329]

In chapters 3–5, Duke explores the relationship between laws and politeiai (constitutions). He argues for "the constitutional relativity of law" (15, 63, and passim) as being nevertheless still subject to normative evaluation based on the "common advantage (to koine[i] sumpheron)" (85). Duke tackles the division between "individualist" and "holist" readings of the "common advantage," arguing that both elements are present in its ability to serve, respectively, as "a motivating reason for individuals to enter the polis" and as "a normative reason … which serves as a criterion" for evaluating constitutions and laws (87). With John Finnis and Liam Murphy, he claims that Aristotle employs a "method of focal analysis" (147–48) in relating the lawful to the just. And he follows Hans Rosler's Razian reconstruction of Aristotle on obedience to law, supplementing it with a holistic account of the value of eunomia. Against critics like Eugene Garver, Duke argues that the importance of legal stability for habituation rightly counts for Aristotle against overly activist approaches to constitutional and legal reform.

In chapters 6 and 7, Duke explores the role of natural justice in Aristotle's thinking about law. In chapter 6, Duke contends that "Aristotle holds to some, if not all, central commitments associated with natural law positions" (139). In chapter 7, he discusses the relationship of law to equity (epieikeia), arguing that "the mature practically reasonable citizen" (159)—or spoudaios (more textually accurate than the tendency of modern philosophers to refer to the phronimos)—relies on a foundation of natural justice rather than exemplifying decisionism.

The "cautious conclusion" (139) of chapter 6 on natural law is nevertheless likely to invite critical disagreement. Duke treats Aristotle's standard of justice as "a ground for the evaluation of positive law as just or unjust" (130), working out a reading of political justice as being in one part natural, in another conventional (Nicomachean Ethics V.7, 1134b18–22), and also points to his treatment of the best constitution as aiming at virtue. He takes both as cases of Aristotle's supporting key tenets of the natural law tradition. Yet this would make any metaphysical realist a candidate for natural lawyer, and discounts the lack of lawlike form attaching to Aristotelian natural justice. Duke's comparisons of Aristotelian to Thomist and Stoic conceptions of natural law do not clarify in what sense of 'dependence' Aristotle could be understood to hold the "natural law" position "that the existence and content of positive law depends in some way on normative facts" (141).

Two further criticisms both hinge on philosophical contrasts that incorporate overly modern assumptions. While Duke rightly asserts that "the true founding legislator of the best constitution is presumably Aristotle himself, or at least a practically wise statesperson...

审核人：

• 亚里斯多德与法律：诺莫斯的政治，乔治·杜克（George Duke）
• 梅利莎·莱恩（Melissa Lane）

在这本出色的书中，乔治·杜克（George Duke）借鉴了以前发表的文章，收集了亚里士多德法律讨论的零散线索，同时捍卫了亚里斯多德引发的各种哲学辩论中的明确立场。这本书在亚里士多德的方法论和形而上学的基础上发展起来，认为应将礼貌理解为一种形式上的原因（64），这一观点是根据《政治第三书》中所提供的连续定义得出的。在研究名词含义的演变的基础上，偶尔参考主要在雅典的希腊法律历史和惯例，该书将我认为是三个主题的内容分为七个章节。

在第1章和第2章中，杜克论述了法律在亚里士多德的伦理和政治中的地位，被理解为实践哲学的实践。他认为，法律作为一种机制进入了《尼科马奇伦理学》的最终书，其中包括强制性指导那些可能未完全理解其合理性的公民的方法。他认为，政治的这种结构与政治一的“政治自然主义”（14、54和被动）是一致的，只要人性本身被理解为具有行使实际理性的潜力，这在政治学中就已经完善了。 “建筑立法者”（9、11和passim）。[结束页329]

在第3-5章中，杜克大学探讨了法律与政治（宪法）之间的关系。他主张“法律的宪法相对性”（15、63和passim）仍然受到基于“共同利益（对koine [i] sumpheron的共同利益”）的规范性评估。）（85）。杜克（Duke）解决了“共同利益”的“个人主义”和“整体主义”之间的区别，认为这两个要素分别发挥了其服务能力，是“个人进入社会的动机”。都会”，并作为“评估宪法和法律的标准理由……”（87）。与约翰·芬尼斯（John Finnis）和利亚姆·墨菲（Liam Murphy）一起，他声称亚里士多德在关联方面采用了“焦点分析法”（147-48）。他遵循汉斯·罗斯勒（Hans Rosler）对亚里士多德（Aristotle）服从法律的拉兹（Razian）重建，并补充了对全部优待价值的解释。。在反对尤金·加弗（Eugene Garver）这样的批评家时，杜克认为，法律习惯对于习惯化的重要性理应归功于亚里士多德，而不是过度的激进主义者进行宪法和法律改革。

在第6章和第7章中，杜克探讨了自然正义在亚里士多德法律思想中的作用。在第6章中，杜克主张“亚里士多德坚持与自然法地位相关的一些甚至所有核心承诺”（139）。在第7章中，他讨论了法律与公平的关系（epieikeia），认为“成熟的，实际上合理的公民”（159）或spoudaios（在文字上比现代哲学家指称phronimos的趋势更准确）依赖于是自然正义的基础，而不是示范决定主义。

但是，关于自然法的第6章的“谨慎结论”（139）可能会引起批判性分歧。杜克（Duke）将亚里士多德的正义标准视为“评价实在法律是否公正或不公正的依据”（130），认为政治正义在某种程度上是自然而然的，是另一种传统的理解（《尼科马奇伦理学》）（V.7，1134b18-22），并指出他对待美德的最佳体质。他将亚里士多德都支持自然法传统的主要原则作为案例。然而，这将使任何形而上的现实主义者成为自然律师的候选人，并且消除了亚里士多德自然正义所缺乏的类似法律形式的缺陷。杜克对亚里士多德与汤姆斯和斯托伊克自然法概念的比较并未阐明亚里士多德在哪种“依赖”意义上可以理解为“自然法”立场，即“实法的存在和内容在某种程度上取决于规范性事实”。 ”（141）。

另外两种批评都依赖于包含了过分现代假设的哲学对比。尽管杜克正确地断言：“最好宪法的真正立宪者应该是亚里士多德本人，或者至少是一个实践上明智的政治家……”