Reviewed by:

• Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil by George Huxford
• Matthew C. Altman

A theodicy attempts to reconcile the existence of evil (or really any imperfection) with the belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. Hume, among others, thought that they were incompatible, and he used it as an argument against God's existence. Leibniz claimed that this was the best of all possible worlds because metaphysical evil is unavoidable and moral and physical evil lead to greater goods. Kant, however, has mostly been left out of the conversation. George Huxford seeks to correct this.

The problem of evil is as difficult as it sounds. In the first place, there are several kinds of evil that would seem to need explanation, including physical or natural evil (suffering), metaphysical evil (limitation), moral evil (sin), and injustice (the fact that evil people often thrive and good people often suffer). There are at least three different kinds of responses to the problem. One approach is a theoretical, speculative, "doctrinal" (123), or "philosophical" theodicy (xviii–xix), which attempts to infer knowledge of God's reasons for acting. Another response is fideism, which appeals to nonrational faith that God must know best. A third approach is practical or "authentic" theodicy (124), which derives God's existence and ultimate justice on moral grounds. The most common philosophical theodicies include the limited-view defense (we cannot know God's purposes); the instrumental, net-good, postponement, or higher-purpose defense (something good comes from evil); and the free-will defense (we, not God, are responsible for sin). Huxford's attempt to explain these varied approaches, combined with the fact that Kant's theodical positions change throughout his career, lead to a dense and sometimes confusing exegesis.

Huxford explains and evaluates Kant's different answers to the problem in the pre-Critical, early Critical, and late Critical periods. In the pre-Critical period, Kant defends a philosophical theodicy and adopts a Leibnizian approach. Suffering is not evil per se, because it does not involve judgment or desert; it is rather the result of natural law. Metaphysical evil is merely limitation, not positive evil. And moral evil is attributable not to God but to human beings' misuse of their freedom. Huxford says that this argument [End Page 333] does not succeed in answering the problem of evil, since God is still indirectly responsible for evil in deciding to create a finite world, one in which God knows we will act wrongly. In the early Critical period, Kant does not explicitly defend a philosophical theodicy, but his writings, especially unpublished lecture notes, seem to indicate that he continued to believe in the best possible world approach (with some elements of the limited-view and instrumental defenses), even though such a claim transcends the limits on human knowledge that Kant establishes in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). In the late Critical period, especially in "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies" (1791), Kant argues against many different philosophical theodicies. According to Huxford, not every argument succeeds, but he says that Kant can rule out speculative theodicies as a class because they are predicated on insight into God's reasoning based on our experience of the world. Since we can have no knowledge regarding noumena, that is impossible. Instead, Kant proposes his authentic theodicy: we can rationally justify practical faith in God as a holy being, acting necessarily in accordance with what reason and morality require. Although we cannot know why God acts, we can trust in God's moral wisdom to do what is best. Huxford concludes that Kant's mature view fails as a theodicy because it does not actually explain the compatibility of God and evil.

Huxford's limited focus on theodicy, his frequent use of textual evidence, and his division of the book into Kant's three periods provide good insights into Kant's philosophical development. Huxford often relies on minor texts and texts that were unpublished during Kant's lifetime...

审核人：

• 康德与狄奥迪西：寻找邪恶问题的答案，乔治·赫克斯福德（George Huxford）
• 马修·C·奥特曼

神学试图用对全能，无所不知和全能的神的信仰来调和邪恶的存在（或什至是任何不完美的存在）。休ume等人认为这是不相容的，因此他将其用作反对上帝存在的论据。莱布尼兹声称，这是所有可能世界中最好的，因为形而上的邪恶是不可避免的，道德和肉体上的邪恶导致更大的财富。但是，康德基本上没有参与对话。乔治·赫克斯福德（George Huxford）试图纠正这一问题。

邪恶的问题听起来很困难。首先，似乎有几种邪恶需要解释，包括自然或自然的邪恶（遭受痛苦），形而上的邪恶（局限性），道德的邪恶（罪恶）和不公正（邪恶的人经常壮成长，好人经常受苦）。对该问题至少有三种不同的响应。一种方法是理论的，推测的，“教义的”（123）或“哲学的”神学（xviii–xix），它试图推断出有关上帝行事原因的知识。另一种回应是信仰主义，它诉诸于非理性的信仰，即上帝必须最了解。第三种方法是实践的或“真实的”神学（124），它从道德的基础上得出了上帝的存在和最终的正义。最常见的哲学神学包括有限视野的辩护（我们不知道上帝的旨意）；工具性的，净商品的，延期的或更高目的的防御（某些东西来自邪恶）；和自由意志的辩护（我们而不是上帝为罪负责）。赫克斯福德（Huxford）试图解释这些不同的方法，再加上康德（Kant）的理论立场在整个职业生涯中都在变化，这一事实导致了密集的，有时是令人困惑的解释。

赫克斯福德（Huxford）解释并评估了康德（Kant）在关键时期之前，关键时期早期和关键时期后期对问题的不同回答。在批评前时期，康德捍卫了一个哲学神学，并采用了莱布尼兹主义的方法。苦难本质上不是邪恶的，因为它不涉及判断力或漠不关心。而是自然法则的结果。形而上的邪恶仅仅是限制，不是积极的邪恶。道德上的邪恶不归因于上帝，而是归因于人类滥用自由。赫克斯福德（Huxford）说，这种说法[End Page 333上帝并没有间接为邪恶负责，而是决定建立一个有限的世界，在这个世界中上帝知道我们会做出错误的举动，但它并没有成功地解决邪恶的问题。在关键的早期，康德并未明确捍卫哲学神学，但他的著作，尤其是未发表的讲义，似乎表明他继续相信世界上可能的最佳方法（包括有限视角和工具性辩护的某些要素）。 ），即使这样的主张超越了康德在“纯粹理性批判”中确立的人类知识的界限（1781/1787）。在关键时期的后期，特别是在“关于所有尝试的哲学神学的失败”（1791）中，康德反对许多不同的哲学神学。根据赫克斯福德的说法，并不是所有论点都能成功，但他说康德可以排除投机神学，因为它们是基于我们对世界的经验对神的推理的洞察力。由于我们不知道有关noumena的知识，因此这是不可能的。相反，康德提出了他的真实神学：我们可以合理地证明对神作为圣洁者的实际信仰，必须根据理性和道德的要求行事。尽管我们不知道上帝为什么要行动，但我们可以相信上帝的道德智慧才能做到最好。赫克斯福德得出的结论是，康德解释上帝与邪恶的兼容性。

赫x福德对神学的关注有限，他经常使用文本证据，并将这本书分为康德的三个时期，这为康德的哲学发展提供了很好的见识。赫克斯福德经常依靠次要的文字和康德一生中未出版的文字...