Reviewed by:

• Kant's Revolutionary Theory of Modality by Uygar Abaci
• Ralf M. Bader

Uygar Abaci's Kant's Revolutionary Theory of Modality starts with a helpful and illuminating historical contextualization of Kant's theory of modality. It sets out the ontotheological debates that form the backdrop of Kant's pre-Critical modal theorizing. Abaci covers the proofs of the existence of God by Anselm and Descartes, as well as Leibniz and Wolff. The first two start from the idea of God as the ens perfectissimum and then try to establish the existence of God by arguing that existence is a perfection. The last two, by contrast, consider God to be the ens necessarium, such that God exists necessarily, provided the concept of God is not self-contradictory; they then attempt to establish the possibility of God by identifying the ens necessarium with the ens perfectissimum, which allows them to argue that this concept only contains positive predicates that cannot contradict each other. [End Page 334]

The second part of Abaci's book covers Kant's pre-Critical modal theory, both his critique of the ontological argument in terms of existence not being a real predicate and his own attempt to establish the existence of God in "The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of the Existence of God" of 1763 (OPA). Kant is standardly taken to depart decisively from his logicist predecessors by introducing a conception of real modality in the OPA. Once real possibility is not merely a matter of conformity to the logical law of noncontradiction and, correspondingly, real necessity is not a matter of logical necessity, room opens up for Kant's argument that, even though God's existence is not logically necessary (given that existence is not a real predicate), it is nevertheless really necessary, since God is the ground of all possibility such that God's non-existence would cancel all possibility.

Abaci argues that Leibniz and Wolff already had a conception of real modality and that Kant's pre-Critical work on modality is, accordingly, merely revisionary and belongs to the same paradigm as that of his predecessors. He correctly points out that some rationalists, most notably Leibniz, accepted material conditions on possibility in the form of an actualist principle, according to which every possibility must be grounded in something actual. These material conditions, however, have no bearing on what possibility consists in—that is, on what it is to be possible—but only on which things are possible. In other words, they concern what material there is to which the conditions of possibility can apply. A genuine account of real modality would also include nonlogical formal conditions on what it is to be possible, something that neither Leibniz nor Wolff countenances. Attributing a conception of real modality to them is thus somewhat tenuous. Abaci's claim that Kant's OPA theory is broadly continuous with that of his predecessors can nevertheless be sustained. In particular, one might think that Kant himself does not have a genuine conception of real modality in the OPA and that this is one of the crucial innovations of his Critical modal theory. Abaci provides strong arguments against the standard interpretation that Kant recognizes metaphysical incompatibilities in the OPA. He nicely illustrates how real opposition, which involves opposed grounds that cancel each other's consequences, implies a logical contradiction in the case of the ens realissimum, insofar as real opposition results in a lack or defect that is logically incompatible with having all perfections to a maximal degree, thereby illustrating that countenancing real opposition need not imply countenancing real modality.

Whereas Abaci considers the pre-Critical modal theory to be merely revisionary, he finds its Critical counterpart revolutionary (though he recognizes that the core ideas are already, at least implicitly, present in the OPA and that their systematic development naturally leads to the Critical modal theory—in fact, Abaci nicely sets out how theorizing about real modality plays an important instrumental role in prompting the Critical turn). The third part of the book comprehensively covers the core...

审核人：

• 康德的情态革命理论，作者：乌加·阿比（Uygar Abaci）
• 拉尔夫·巴德（Ralf M.Bader）

乌加尔·阿巴奇（Uygar Abaci）的康德情态革命理论始于对康德情态理论的有益而具有启发性的历史语境化。它提出了构成康德批判前模态理论化背景的本体论辩论。Abaci涵盖了Anselm和Descartes以及Leibniz和Wolff证明上帝存在的证据。前两个是从上帝作为完美主义者的思想开始的，然后通过争论存在是一个完美来尝试建立上帝的存在。相比之下，后两者认为上帝是必需品，因此只要上帝的概念不矛盾，上帝就必定存在。然后，他们通过确定ENS necessarium与ENS perfectissimum，这使得他们认为，这个概念只包含不能相互矛盾正谓词。[第334页]

Abaci的书的第二部分介绍了康德的批评前模态理论，他既对存在论不是真正的谓词进行了本体论论证，也对他自己在《论证的唯一可能依据》中确立上帝的存在进行了尝试。 1763（OPA）的“上帝存在的证明”。通过在OPA中引入实物模式的概念，康德通常被认为与他的逻辑主义前辈有决定性的背离。一旦真正的可能性不仅仅是与非矛盾的逻辑律相一致的问题，并且相应地，真正的必要性就不是逻辑上的必然性问题，那么康德就可以提出这样的观点：即使上帝的存在在逻辑上也不是必须的（假设存在）不是一个真正的谓词），但这确实是必要的，

Abaci认为，莱布尼兹和沃尔夫已经有了真正的情态概念，因此，康德的关于情态的批评前工作仅是修订性的，并且与他的前任属于同一范式。他正确地指出，一些理性主义者，最著名的是莱布尼兹，以一种现实主义原则的形式接受了关于可能性的物质条件，根据这种条件，每种可能性都必须以某种实际事物为基础。但是，这些物质条件与可能的可能性无关，即与可能的可能性无关，而仅与可能的事情有关。换句话说，他们关注的是可能适用的条件是什么材料。对真实情态的真实描述还将包括关于可能的形式的非逻辑形式条件，莱布尼兹和沃尔夫都没有这种表情。因此，将真实情态的概念归因于他们有些微不足道。但是，Abaci声称康德的OPA理论与他的前任者在很大程度上是连续的。特别是，人们可能会认为康德本人在OPA中没有真正的情态概念，这是他的批判情态理论的关键创新之一。Abaci强烈反对康德认识到OPA中形而上的不相容性的标准解释。他很好地说明了真正的反对，其中涉及抵消彼此后果的相反理由，在这种情况下意味着逻辑上的矛盾。但是，Abaci声称康德的OPA理论与他的前任者在很大程度上是连续的。特别是，人们可能会认为康德本人在OPA中没有真正的情态概念，这是他的批判情态理论的关键创新之一。Abaci强烈反对康德认识到OPA中形而上的不相容性的标准解释。他很好地说明了真正的反对，其中涉及抵消彼此后果的相反理由，在这种情况下意味着逻辑上的矛盾。但是，Abaci声称康德的OPA理论与他的前任者在很大程度上是连续的。特别是，人们可能会认为康德本人在OPA中没有真正的情态概念，这是他的批判情态理论的关键创新之一。Abaci强烈反对康德认识到OPA中形而上的不相容性的标准解释。他很好地说明了真正的反对，其中涉及抵消彼此后果的相反理由，在这种情况下意味着逻辑上的矛盾。有人可能会认为，康德本人在OPA中没有真正的情态概念，这是他的批判情态理论的一项关键创新。Abaci强烈反对康德认识到OPA中形而上的不相容性的标准解释。他很好地说明了真正的反对，其中涉及抵消彼此后果的相反理由，在这种情况下意味着逻辑上的矛盾。有人可能会认为，康德本人在OPA中没有真正的情态概念，这是他的批判情态理论的一项关键创新。Abaci强烈反对康德认识到OPA中形而上的不相容性的标准解释。他很好地说明了真正的反对，其中涉及抵消彼此后果的相反理由，在这种情况下意味着逻辑上的矛盾。就现实反对而言，只要真正的对立导致缺乏或缺陷，就逻辑上来说就无法与最大程度地具有所有完善性相抵触，从而表明，对真正的对立进行推崇并不一定意味着对实在的形式进行推崇。

尽管Abaci认为批评前的模态理论只是修订版，但他发现批评的关键模态理论是革命性的（尽管他认识到OPA已经至少隐含了核心思想，并且它们的系统发展自然导致了批评的模态理论—实际上，Abaci很好地阐明了关于真实情态的理论如何在促使关键性转向方面发挥重要的工具作用）。本书的第三部分全面介绍了核心内容。