We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure concentration. Using data from forty-six countries, we show that firms form more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. We propose a trade-off framework of optimal debt structure and show that in strong creditor rights regimes, the benefit of forming concentrated structures outweighs its cost. Because strong creditor protections increase liquidation bias, firms choose concentrated debt structures to improve the probability of successful distressed debt renegotiations. Firms with ex ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with higher intangibility, cash flow volatility, R&D expenses, and leverage, exhibit stronger effects. Firms with restricted access to capital are also affected more. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.

中文翻译：

---

国家层面的债权人保护会影响企业层面的债务结构集中度吗？

我们研究了国家层面债权人保护对企业层面债务结构集中度选择的影响。我们使用来自 46 个国家的数据表明，公司在债权人保护更强的国家形成了更集中的债务结构。我们提出了一个最佳债务结构的权衡框架，并表明在强大的债权人权利制度中，形成集中结构的好处大于其成本。由于强有力的债权人保护会增加清算偏差，因此公司选择集中债务结构来提高不良债务重新谈判成功的可能性。事前破产成本较高的公司，包括那些无形资产、现金流波动性、研发费用和杠杆率较高的公司，表现出更强的影响。获得资本受限的公司也受到更大影响。对公司债务结构对债权人权利改革的反应的差异差异分析证实了跨国结果。我们的研究结果对替代设置和一系列稳健性检查是稳健的。