We propose a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. An agent (firm or worker) can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is bound by her commitment and cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. A free agent can make decisions independently. Every agent has preferences over multiple contracts and tries to find her best possible partner with a contract. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and to set free as many committed agents as possible without violating any commitment. We show the existence of stable and (strict) core matchings through our designed market mechanism and obtain a lattice result for such outcomes and incentive compatibility results for the mechanism.

我们提出了一个具有多个异质在职者和新进入者的高级职位匹配模型。代理商（公司或工作人员）可以是承诺的，也可以是不承诺的（即免费的）。忠诚的代理商受其承诺的约束，除非合伙人同意，否则不能单方面解散合伙企业。自由球员可以独立做出决定。每个代理人都对多个合同具有优先权，并试图找到合同中可能的最佳合作伙伴。我们研究了如何尽可能地匹配工人和公司并在不违反任何承诺的情况下释放尽可能多的承诺代理商的问题。我们通过我们设计的市场机制显示了稳定和（严格）核心匹配的存在，并获得了此类结果的晶格结果和该机制的激励相容性结果。