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Participant Attacks on Quantum Secret Sharing Based on Local Measurements
International Journal of Theoretical Physics ( IF 1.4 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-24 , DOI: 10.1007/s10773-021-04792-2
Qin-Xi Bai

Quantum secret sharing (QSS) provides an efficient way for managing keys securely. Generally, the dishonest participant is a stronger attacker than others in QSS, and then the participant attack should be particularly analyzed. In this paper, the security of two QSS protocols based on GHZ states and local measurements has been further reviewed. Using the participant attack model, Hillery et al. (Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829, 1999) and general HBB-like protocols are analyzed, and they are both insecure: the dishonest participant can restore all of the key without being detected just using local unitary operation and local measurements. Even inserting some nonorthogonal states in the phase of distributing particles, the dishonest participant can also restore all of the key without being detected just using local unitary operation and local measurements. Two key factors of insecurity are deduced: the dishonest participant and the sender have the same ability to control GHZ states, and there are no monitoring strategies in the secret recovery phase. Therefore, how to design multi-party key distribution protocols fixing the two security vulnerabilities is meaningful.



中文翻译:

基于局部测量的量子秘密共享的参与者攻击

量子秘密共享(QSS)提供了一种安全地管理密钥的有效方法。通常,不诚实的参与者比QSS中的其他参与者更强大,因此应特别分析参与者的攻击。在本文中,对基于GHZ状态和本地测量的两种QSS协议的安全性进行了进一步的审查。使用参与者攻击模型,Hillery等人。(物理修订版A 59,1829年,1999年)和通用的类似HBB的协议都进行了分析,它们都不安全:不诚实的参与者可以恢复所有密钥,而无需使用本地统一操作和本地测量就可以检测到。即使在分配粒子的阶段插入了一些非正交状态,不诚实的参与者也可以恢复所有密钥,而无需仅使用局部local运算和局部测量就可以检测到。推论出不安全的两个关键因素:不诚实的参与者和发送者具有控制GHZ状态的相同能力,并且在秘密恢复阶段没有监视策略。因此,如何设计用于修复这两个安全漏洞的多方密钥分发协议是有意义的。

更新日期:2021-04-24
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