ABSTRACT

Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest that this articulation is centrally operative in Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. As Frege argues, it follows from judgement’s self-consciousness that truth is indefinable.

摘要

弗雷格将判断描述为承认思想的真实性，从而排除错误判断。在这篇论文中，我首先解释了弗雷格的特征，以便它不会产生这种后果。弗雷格并不是说主体S判断p就是让S承认p思想的真实性。相反，他在自我意识中阐明了判断的本质。从内部，判断意味着承认一个真理。其次，我认为这种表述在弗雷格关于真理不可定义性的论证中具有核心作用。正如弗雷格所说，根据判断的自我意识，真理是不可定义的。