The motivation problem as normally conceived is a problem about explaining the special connection between moral judgment and motivation. This understanding of the problem has structured a great deal of thinking in contemporary metaethics and moral psychology. For example, claims about the special motivational import of moral judgment have figured as central premises in the most influential arguments for noncognitivism. But debates about moral motivation have eventuated in seemingly intractable disputes between internalists and externalists about, for example, the possibility of genuine amoralism. In this paper, I motivate a new way forward, which draws underappreciated insights from philosophical thinking about the irrationality of akrasia. One central lesson is that discussions of the motivation problem should move away from the focus on moral judgment specifically. A more controversial and radical proposal is that the traditional motivation problem can be dissolved. Contra externalists, there is one fundamental and necessary connection between judgment and motivation. But this connection—a connection between all things considered normative judgment and motivation in rational agents—in fact requires no special explanation at all.

中文翻译：

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Akrasia 和道德动机

通常设想的动机问题是关于解释道德判断和动机之间的特殊联系的问题。这种对这个问题的理解在当代元伦理学和道德心理学中构建了大量的思考。例如，关于道德判断的特殊动机重要性的主张已被视为非认知主义最有影响力的论点的中心前提。但是关于道德动机的争论最终导致了内部主义者和外部主义者之间看似棘手的争论，例如，真正的非道德主义的可能性。在这篇论文中，我提出了一条新的前进道路，它从关于 akrasia 的非理性的哲学思考中汲取了被低估的见解。一个核心教训是，对动机问题的讨论应该远离专门关注道德判断。一个更具争议性和激进的提议是可以解决传统的动机问题。与外部主义者相反，判断和动机之间存在一种基本且必要的联系。但这种联系——所有被认为是规范判断和理性行动者动机的事物之间的联系——实际上根本不需要特别解释。