This paper demonstrates that two signature methodological concepts in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, the epoché and the phenomenological reduction, derive from his reflections on the history and significance of epistemological skepticism in the Western tradition. Drawing on his Lectures on Logic and Epistemology (Hua XXIV) from the Winter semester of 1906–07, it is argued that Husserl derives his conception of the fundamental task of transcendental philosophy from his reading of a novel skeptical challenge posed by David Hume’s philosophy—a kind of skeptical challenge that Husserl did not recognize in his earlier treatments of Hume. On Husserl’s revised reading, Hume promotes a certain kind of philosophical “despair” (Verzweiflung) or, as it may be called today, “quietism” as the only possible response to the traditional problems of epistemology stemming back to the ancient skeptics. Husserl’s criticism of Hume’s quietism is presented. And Husserl’s reading of Descartes’s cogito as the first decisive uncovering of the limits of epistemological skepticism in the Western tradition is shown to be the source of two key elements of Husserl’s positive alternative to Humean epistemological quietism, which ultimately become the heart of a novel conception of critical transcendental philosophy. These two key elements are the phenomenological epoché and phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s arguments are presented for the claim that these are essential parts of any epistemological program that can answer traditional skeptical challenges.

本文证明了胡塞尔的先验现象学中的两个标志性方法论概念，即时代和现象学还原，源于他对西方传统认识论怀疑论的历史和意义的反思。借鉴他的逻辑和认识论讲座（华二十四）从1906-07的冬季学期，有论者认为胡塞尔派生他的先验哲学的根本任务的观念从他由大卫·休谟的philosophy-提出了新的挑战持怀疑态度的阅读胡塞尔在他对休ume的早期治疗中没有意识到这种怀疑的挑战。在胡塞尔（Husserl）的修订读物中，休ume（Hume）提倡某种哲学上的“绝望”（Verzweiflung），或者今天称之为“安静论”，它是对源于古代怀疑论者的传统认识论问题的唯一可能回应。提出了胡塞尔对休ume的安静主义的批评。胡塞尔对笛卡尔的可卡托的解读是对西方传统认识论怀疑论的第一个决定性发现，被证明是胡塞尔积极地替代休曼主义认识论安静论的两个关键因素的源泉，最终成为了关于胡斯派认识论安静论的新思想的核心。批判的先验哲学。这两个关键要素是现象学时代和现象学还原。提出了胡塞尔的论点，主张这些是可以解决传统怀疑挑战的任何认识论纲领的重要组成部分。