Institutional explanations of intra-party violence rarely address political economy dynamics shaping the institutions in question, and therefore they fail to understand their emergence and their stability. Specifically, focusing on institutional factors alone does not enable a nuanced understanding of candidate nomination violence and why some constituencies are peaceful while others are violent. This article theorizes nomination violence in dominant-party systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on political settlement theory, it examines the nature of nomination violence in Uganda’s October 2015 National Resistance Movement (NRM) primaries. We argue that the violence is a constitutive part of Uganda’s political settlement under the NRM. Nomination procedures remain weak in order for the NRM ruling elite to include multiple factions that compete for access while being able to intervene in the election process when needed. This means, in turn, that violence tends to become particularly prominent in constituencies characterized by proxy wars, where competition between local candidates is reinforced by a conflict among central-level elites in the president’s inner circle. We call for the proxy war thesis to be tested in case studies of other dominant parties’ nomination processes.

中文翻译：

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乌干达民族抵抗运动中的提名暴力

对党内暴力的制度解释很少涉及塑造相关制度的政治经济动态，因此他们无法理解它们的出现和稳定性。具体而言，仅关注制度因素并不能对候选人提名暴力以及为什么一些选区是和平的而另一些选区是暴力的有细致入微的理解。本文对撒哈拉以南非洲占主导地位的政党制度中的提名暴力进行了理论分析。借鉴政治解决理论，它考察了乌干达 2015 年 10 月全国抵抗运动 (NRM) 初选中提名暴力的性质。我们认为，暴力是乌干达在 NRM 下的政治解决方案的组成部分。提名程序仍然薄弱，以便 NRM 统治精英包括多个争夺进入权的派系，同时能够在需要时干预选举过程。反过来，这意味着暴力往往在以代理人战争为特征的选区变得尤为突出，在这些选区中，地方候选人之间的竞争因总统核心圈子中的中央级精英之间的冲突而加剧。我们呼吁在其他主要政党提名过程的案例研究中检验代理人战争论点。地方候选人之间的竞争因总统核心圈子中的中央级精英之间的冲突而加剧。我们呼吁在其他主要政党提名过程的案例研究中检验代理人战争论点。地方候选人之间的竞争因总统核心圈子中的中央级精英之间的冲突而加剧。我们呼吁在其他主要政党提名过程的案例研究中检验代理人战争论点。