This paper argues that social trust is the emergent product of a complex system of property relations, backed up by a sub-system of mutual monitoring. This happens in a context similar to Ostrom’s commons, where cooperation is necessary for the management of resources, in the absence of external authorities to enforce sanctions. I show that social trust emerges in this context because of an institutional structure that enables individuals to develop a generalized disposition to internalize the external effects of their actions. This is made possible by the “patrimonial” nature of this structure.

中文翻译：

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社会信任的基石：在公地背景下习惯机制和财产关系对社会信任产生的作用

本文认为，社会信任是由相互监督的子系统支持的复杂的财产关系系统的产物。这种情况发生在类似于奥斯特罗姆（Ostrom）的公地的情况下，在这种情况下，需要合作来管理资源，而没有外部机构来实施制裁。我表明，在这种背景下出现社会信任是由于一种制度结构，它使个人能够发展出一种普遍的性格，以内化其行为的外部影响。这种结构的“世袭”性质使之成为可能。