In Náisiúnta Leictreach Contraitheoir Éireann v Labour Court, the Irish High Court struck down as unconstitutional a key component of Ireland’s industrial relations system for the third time in recent years. The Court determined that the extension of collective agreements erga omnes breaches the constitutional prohibition on the delegation of legislative power. This note explains the background to that decision and critiques the Court’s reasoning from the perspective of a ‘labour constitution’ model of labour law, and in light of international and European legal principles. The decision appears to misunderstand the place of collective bargaining at a sectoral level within European internal market and competition law. It also seems to rule out any form of meaningful participation by workers, employers and their representatives in collective bargaining on a sectoral basis or through dedicated industrial relations machinery. According to the vision of Irish constitutional law put forward in this case, decisions relating to the administration of production and economic life more broadly must be reserved to the legislature. This is a significant loss for the autonomy of the social partners and represents an impoverished understanding of democracy and legitimacy within the constitutional order, and risks leaving Ireland even more of an outlier in Europe than it already is on the issue of sectoral collective bargaining.

在NáisiúntaLeictreach ContraitheoirÉireann诉劳动法院一案中，爱尔兰高等法院近年来因违反宪法而被废除，这是爱尔兰劳资关系体系的重要组成部分。法院裁定，集体协议的延期是普遍的违反了宪法对立法权下放的禁令。本说明解释了该决定的背景，并从劳动法的“劳动宪法”模型的角度以及国际和欧洲法律原则对法院的推理进行了批评。该决定似乎误解了集体谈判在欧洲内部市场和竞争法中在部门层面上的地位。它还似乎排除了工人，雇主及其代表以部门形式或通过专门的劳资关系机制进行集体谈判的任何形式的有意义的参与。根据在此案中提出的爱尔兰宪法的愿景，与生产和经济生活管理有关的决定必须更广泛地保留给立法机关。