Carnap’s 1931 attack against metaphysics notoriously utilises Heidegger’s work to exemplify the meaninglessness of metaphysical pseudo-statements. This paper interprets Carnap’s metametaphysics as concerned with delimiting theoretical dialogue in such a manner as to exclude unresolvable disagreements. It puts forth a revised version of Carnap’s argument against the viability of metaphysics, by setting aside his stronger claims that rely on verificationism and focusing instead on his account of metaphysical claims as mere expressions of what he calls “Lebensgefühl,” or a general attitude towards life. Such attitudes, Carnap argues, are unsuitable objects of theoretical dialogue, insofar as disagreements that concern them are unresolvable. Carnap thus recommends abandoning the attempt to resolve metaphysical disagreements as if they were theoretical. As long as it does not enter into unresolvable disagreements, art, rather than theory, is the appropriate medium for expressing Lebensgefühl.

中文翻译：

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卡尔纳普形而上学中无法解决的分歧

众所周知，卡尔纳普 1931 年对形而上学的攻击利用海德格尔的著作来举例说明形而上学伪陈述的无意义。本文将卡尔纳普的形而上学解释为以排除无法解决的分歧的方式界定理论对话。它提出了卡尔纳普反对形而上学可行性的论点的修订版本，搁置了他依赖验证主义的更强有力的主张，而将重点放在他对形而上学主张的解释上，这些主张仅仅是他所谓的“Lebensgefühl”的表达，或者是对形而上学的普遍态度。生活。卡尔纳普认为，这种态度是不适合进行理论对话的对象，因为与他们有关的分歧无法解决。因此，卡尔纳普建议放弃解决形而上学分歧的尝试，就好像它们是理论上的一样。Lebensgefühl。