We examine whether initiations of bank loans with financial covenants motivate banks to monitor borrowers’ accounting practice and result in a higher quality of reported accruals and a better information environment for firms. We document that, relative to loans without financial covenants, loans with financial covenants lead to an improvement in accrual quality measured by the extent to which accruals can be mapped into cash flows. The effect of loan covenants on accrual quality is stronger when external monitoring by non-bank stakeholders (i.e., institutional investors and financial analysts) is weaker. Furthermore, initiations of bank loans with financial covenants are related to subsequent improvements in analysts’ information environment. The evidence supports the view that bank monitoring improves accounting quality.

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银行贷款契约、应计质量与企业信息环境

我们研究了启动具有金融契约的银行贷款是否会促使银行监控借款人的会计实践，并导致报告应计项目的质量更高，并为公司提供更好的信息环境。我们记录了，相对于没有金融契约的贷款，有金融契约的贷款导致应计质量的提高，以应计项目可以映射到现金流量的程度来衡量。当非银行利益相关者（即机构投资者和金融分析师）的外部监督较弱时，贷款契约对应计质量的影响更强。此外，启动具有金融契约的银行贷款与分析师信息环境的后续改善有关。证据支持银行监控提高会计质量的观点。