We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts that bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of players’ winning prizes and marginal costs of effort: the team owner chooses to bribe the player with the most favorable winning prize to marginal cost of effort ratio, and offers a bribe that leaves her indifferent between accepting (and exerting zero effort) and rejecting (and exerting her optimal effort). In some cases, the competition between players and the negative consequences of one player receiving a bribe on the team performance can drag down the equilibrium bribe to zero. We also study the impact of changes in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort on the equilibrium bribing behavior.

我们在具有多个成对战斗的连续团队竞赛中研究贿赂。考虑到获胜奖赏的不对称性和边际成本，我们提出了以下条件：（i）另一个团队的所有者向团队中的一名球员行贿，并且（ii）她接受该行贿。我们证明了这些条件取决于球员的获胜奖赏和边际努力成本的比率：团队所有者选择贿赂拥有最有利的获胜奖赏的球员与边际努力成本的比率，并且提供的贿赂使她之间无动于衷接受（并尽力而为零）和拒绝（并尽力而为）。在某些情况下，球员之间的竞争以及一个球员受贿对团队绩效的负面影响会将平衡贿赂降低到零。