This article challenges the widespread assumption that forgiveness transpires under voluntary control. I explain that that assumption underlies the lively debate of the question of whether forgiveness is or ought to be free or conditional. I then critically examine two accounts of forgiveness, those of Avishai Margalit and Pamela Hieronymi, to which the assumption of control is pivotal, and argue that they are compromised by that assumption. The premise that forgiveness is voluntary leads Margalit to incorrectly dissociate it from forgetting, and Hieronymi to grant judgment a role it can't reliably fulfill on its own. Drawing on works of theory and literature, I suggest that elements outside our control, such as time, other persons, identification and circumstances can play significant parts in bringing forgiveness about. I thus try to pave the way for a more complete view of forgiveness.

中文翻译：

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原谅失控

本文挑战了宽恕是在自愿控制下发生的普遍假设。我解释说，这一假设是关于宽恕是或应该是免费的还是有条件的问题的激烈辩论的基础。然后，我批判性地研究了两个关于宽恕的说法，即 Avishai Margalit 和 Pamela Hieronymi 的说法，其中控制假设是关键，并认为它们受到了这种假设的影响。宽恕是自愿的前提导致 Margalit 错误地将其与遗忘区分开来，而 Hieronymi 赋予判断一个它无法靠自己可靠地完成的角色。借鉴理论和文学作品，我认为我们无法控制的因素，例如时间、其他人、身份和环境，可以在带来宽恕方面发挥重要作用。