Why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology and illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the rationale, potential, and limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist and psychological approaches. Both approaches provide ample justifications for making greater use of rewarding in international law.

中文翻译：

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国际法中的奖励

各国为何遵守国际法长期以来一直处于国际法和国际关系研究的前沿。合规性讨论主要集中在负面激励上。我们认为还有另一种理论不足的机制：奖励。我们提供了如何应用奖励的类型学和插图。此外，我们利用理性主义和心理学方法探索奖励的基本原理、潜力和局限性。这两种方法都为在国际法中更多地使用奖励提供了充分的理由。