Husserl’s official account of essence is modal. It is also, I submit, incompatible with the role that essence is supposed to play, especially relative to necessity, in his overall philosophy. In the Husserlian framework, essence should rather be treated as a non-modal notion. The point, while not generally acknowledged, has been made before (by Kevin Mulligan for one); yet the arguments given for it, though perhaps sound, are not Husserlian. In this paper I present a thoroughly Husserlian argument for that claim, as well as a Husserlian essentialist account of necessity. I also discuss the role of grounding within the account.

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔本质主义

胡塞尔对实质的官方描述是情态的。我认为，这也与本质在他的总体哲学中应该发挥的作用，尤其是相对于必要性不相容。在Husserlian框架中，应将本质视为一种非模态概念。这个观点虽然没有得到普遍认可，但之前已经提出（凯文·穆里根（Kevin Mulligan）提出）；然而，尽管有说服力，但给出的论据并非胡塞尔人。在本文中，我对有关这一主张的观点进行了详尽的论证，并提出了对必要性的论点。我还将讨论帐户内部接地的作用。