We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the unique symmetric equilibrium and the players’ expected payoff. We characterize the upper bound of players’ expected payoff and the corresponding optimal signals utilizing such a relation between the informativeness and the payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information-rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through an unlevel-playing-field channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous.

我们研究了在具有独立私人二进制值的两人全薪拍卖竞赛中私人信息的最佳交换。一个被告知玩家价值观的仁慈信息中心通过公开披露信号促进信息交流。信号的信息量决定了唯一对称均衡的单调性和参与者的预期收益。我们利用信息量和收益之间的这种关系来表征玩家预期收益的上限和相应的最佳信号。当参与者事前充分异质时，最佳信号通过诱导分配有效竞争通过信息租渠道发挥作用。当球员事前足够均匀，最佳信号通过诱导不对称竞争通过不公平的竞争渠道发挥作用。为了保证有效的分配，监管者可以在参与者足够同质时惩罚任何信息交换，当他们足够异质时不施加限制。