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Conceptualizing consciousness
Philosophical Psychology ( IF 1.573 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-16 , DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2021.1914326
Jacob Berger 1 , Richard Brown 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one’s mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. Here, we explore three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption is in tension with the underlying motivations for HOT theory and arguably false. We urge that these objections, though sophisticated, trade on this questionable conception of consciousness, thereby begging the question against HOT theory. We then explain how HOT theory might instead understand consciousness.



中文翻译:

概念化意识

摘要

目前可用的最有前途的意识理论之一是高阶思想(“HOT”)理论,根据该理论,意识在于对一个人的精神生活有合适的 HOT。但对 HOT 理论的批评比比皆是。在这里,我们探讨了最近对该理论的三个反对意见,出于同样的原因,我们在底层创始人中提出了异议。虽然今天许多理论家假设意识是实际存在的心理状态的一个特征,人们凭借其拥有经验,但这种假设与 HOT 理论的潜在动机存在紧张关系,并且可以说是错误的。我们敦促这些反对意见虽然复杂,但以这种有问题的意识概念为依据,从而提出反对 HOT 理论的问题。然后我们解释了 HOT 理论可能如何理解意识。

更新日期:2021-06-15
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