The language of structural sin is most often used to describe sin that inheres in laws, institutions, or social roles—in short, in the objective social architecture of our everyday lives. This article argues that structural sin should also be understood as including a subjective dimension, describing the determinate habits or dispositions instilled by sharing in the life of a particular society. Part of what is structured by structural sin, in other words, is agency itself. The reason that many theologians have resisted this idea is that it seems to undermine the conditions of moral responsibility. If our capacities for knowing and loving the good are always already concretely misshapen, can we rightly be held accountable for what we do? This article argues further that we can, drawing on the work of Judith Butler to sketch a fresh account of personal responsibility in the face of structural sin.

结构性犯罪的语言最常用于描述法律，机构或社会角色中存在的犯罪-简而言之，是我们日常生活的客观社会架构中的犯罪。本文认为，结构性犯罪也应理解为包括一个主观方面，它描述了通过分享特定社会生活而灌输的确定的习惯或性格。换句话说，由结构性罪恶构成的部分是代理机构本身。许多神学家拒绝这个想法的原因是它似乎破坏了道德责任的条件。如果我们认识和热爱善良的能力总是已经具体地变形了，那么我们可以正确地对自己的行为负责吗？本文进一步指出，我们可以，