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Single vs. multiple disclosures in an experimental asset market with information acquisition
The European Journal of Finance ( IF 1.903 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-15 , DOI: 10.1080/1351847x.2021.1911822
Alba Ruiz-Buforn 1 , Simone Alfarano 1 , Eva Camacho-Cuena 1 , Andrea Morone 2
Affiliation  

We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether increasing the number of independent public signals in an economy with endogenous private information is an effective measure to promote the acquisition of information and to enhance price efficiency. We observe that the release of public information crowds out the traders' demand for private information under a single disclosure while favoring private information acquisition under multiple disclosures. The latter measure improves price accuracy in forecasting the asset fundamental value. However, multiple disclosures do not eliminate the adverse effect of market overreaction to public information, becoming a potential source of fragility for the financial system.



中文翻译:

具有信息获取功能的实验性资产市场中的一次披露与多次披露

我们进行实验室实验,以研究在具有内生私人信息的经济体中增加独立公共信号的数量是否是促进信息获取和提高价格效率的有效措施。我们观察到,公开信息的发布使交易者在一次公开信息下对私人信息的需求排挤了,而倾向于在多次公开信息下获取私人信息。后一种措施提高了预测资产基本价值时的价格准确性。但是,多次披露并不能消除市场对公共信息反应过度的不利影响,成为金融体系脆弱性的潜在根源。

更新日期:2021-04-16
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