ABSTRACT

Many philosophers and psychologists have thought that people untutored in philosophy are moral realists. On this view, when people make moral judgments, they interpret their judgments as tracking universal, objective moral facts. But studies of folk metaethics have demonstrated that people have a mix of metaethical attitudes. Sometimes people think of their moral judgments as purely expressive, or as tracking subjective or relative moral facts, or perhaps no facts at all. This paper surveys the evidence for folk metaethical pluralism and argues for an explanation of this mix of folk metaethical attitudes: without philosophical education, these attitudes are typically caused by factors that are insensitive to their truth. Moreover, unless they can be justified by other means, metaethical attitudes with this etiology are, as a result, irrational, and ought not be used as evidence for or against moral realism.

摘要

许多哲学家和心理学家认为，没有受过哲学教育的人是道德现实主义者。根据这种观点，当人们做出道德判断时，他们将自己的判断解释为跟踪普遍的、客观的道德事实。但是对民间元伦理学的研究表明，人们具有混合的元伦理态度。有时人们认为他们的道德判断纯粹是表达性的，或者是跟踪主观或相关的道德事实，或者可能根本没有事实。本文调查了民间元伦理多元主义的证据，并论证了对这种民间元伦理态度混合的解释：如果没有哲学教育，这些态度通常是由对其真相不敏感的因素造成的。此外，除非可以通过其他方式证明它们的合理性，否则具有这种病因的元伦理学态度是不合理的，