Common property summer pastures constitute longstanding evidence that the tragedy of the commons can be prevented through self-organization. As a byproduct of their sustainable governance, high nature value farming systems with well-integrated patchy landscapes have existed for centuries. These common pool resources—which have historically needed protection from overexploitation—today suffer from underutilization, and their continued use is often contingent on government subsidies. The current study sought to identify which user, institutional, and resource attributes contribute to the sustainable use of high nature value summer pastures. Taking as our point of departure a recent field study of Swiss Alpine grazing lands, we set out to experimentally identify the most promising mechanisms for successful resource management in this context. To do so, we implement a controlled experiment that closely mirrors our field observations ("field-in-the-lab"), and parametrize our experiment to replicate field data. Our focus is on the institutional linkage of provision and appropriation. Our treatments varied across a range of parameters, ceteris paribus, to isolate which governance elements are most relevant; we did so to identify which policy options and scenarios should be prioritized in practical policy evaluations. It turns out that underappropriation appears to be the main management challenge for Swiss common property pastures today. Our analytical results suggest that current governance institutions—and, more specifically, how they link appropriation to provision requirements—might need to be overhauled. The most promising avenues for doing so appear to be increased provision requirements, incentivized overprovision, and appropriation subsidies. Thus, our study highlights promising institutional adaptations at various governance levels that potentially counteract the decreasing use of high nature value common property pastures in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe.

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反对放弃夏季共同财产的措施：联合拨款游戏的实验证据

共有财产的夏季牧场构成了长期的证据，表明可以通过自我组织来防止公地的悲剧。作为其可持续治理的副产品，具有高度整合的斑驳景观的高自然价值农业体系已经存在了多个世纪。如今，这些公共池资源（历来需要保护以免过度开发）目前受到利用不足的困扰，它们的持续使用通常取决于政府的补贴。当前的研究试图确定哪些用户，机构和资源属性有助于高价值自然夏季牧场的可持续利用。以我们最近对瑞士高山牧场的实地研究为出发点，我们着手实验确定在这种情况下成功进行资源管理的最有希望的机制。为此，我们实施了一个受控实验，该实验紧密地反映了我们的现场观察结果（“实验室中的现场”），并参数化了我们的实验以复制现场数据。我们的重点是供应与拨款的制度联系。我们的处理方法在各种参数（鸡冠花等）上有所不同，以隔离出哪些治理元素最相关。我们这样做是为了确定在实际政策评估中应优先考虑哪些政策选项和方案。事实证明，拨款不足似乎是当今瑞士共同财产牧场面临的主要管理挑战。我们的分析结果表明，可能需要检查当前的治理机构，尤其是它们如何将拨款与准备要求联系起来。这样做的最有希望的途径似乎是增加拨款要求，鼓励超额准备金和拨款补贴。因此，我们的研究强调了在不同治理级别进行有希望的机构适应，有可能抵消瑞士和欧洲其他地区对高自然价值普通财产牧场的使用减少。