We study an equilibrium model of “revenue diversion” by management and its effects on talent allocation and the earnings distribution. In our occupational choice model with “workers” and “managers”, the talent allocation depends on earnings across occupations. Revenue diversion makes the allocation inefficient. It contributes, beyond productivity differentials, to income inequality and the Pareto tail of the income distribution. Any “diverted” revenue accrues to a small fraction of the population, and therefore noticeably impacts inequality, as illustrated in our calibration. We briefly introduce capital, allowing management to divert from both workers and capital, and also complementarity between workers and management.

我们研究了管理层“收入转移”的均衡模型及其对人才分配和收入分配的影响。在我们具有“工人”和“经理”的职业选择模型中，人才分配取决于各个职业的收入。收入转移使分配效率低下。除生产力差异外，它还导致收入不平等和收入分配的帕累托尾巴。如我们的校准所示，任何“挪用的”收入都应占人口的一小部分，因此会显着影响不平等。我们简要介绍一下资本，使管理层既可以从工人和资本中分离出来，又可以使工人和管理层之间具有互补性。