This study proposes that chief executive officers who have received over their tenure a greater sum of total compensation relative to the market’s going rate become overconfident. We posit that this happens because historically overpaid chief executive officers perceive greater self-worth to the firm whereby such self-serving attribution inflates their level of self-confidence. We also identify chief executive officer- and firm-level cues that can influence the relationship between chief executive officers’ historical relative pay and their overconfidence, suggesting that chief executive officers’ perceived self-worth is more pronounced when chief executive officers possess less power and when their firm’s performance has improved upon their historical aspirations. Using a sample of 1185 firms and their chief executive officers during the years 2000–2016, we find empirical support for our predictions. Findings from this study contribute to strategic leadership research by highlighting the important role of executives’ compensation in creating overconfidence.

这项研究建议，首席执行官在任职期间获得的总薪酬相对于市场行情的涨幅更大，这会使他们变得过分自信。我们认为，发生这种情况是因为历史上薪酬过高的首席执行官对公司具有更大的自我价值感，从而这种自我服务的归属会夸大他们的自信水平。我们还确定了可能影响首席执行官历史相对薪酬与其过分自信之间关系的首席执行官和公司层面的暗示，这表明，当首席执行官拥有更少的权力和能力时，首席执行官的自我价值感就更加明显。当他们的公司业绩因其历史愿望而得到改善时。我们使用2000年至2016年间的1185家公司及其首席执行官的样本，为我们的预测提供了经验支持。这项研究的结果突出了高管人员薪酬在建立过度自信中的重要作用，从而为战略领导力研究做出了贡献。