Under a technology based on the generalized mean of inputs and outputs with constant returns to scale (CRS), the firms have incentive to merge (in a firm game) in order to improve their technical efficiency. A directional complementarity property in inputs and in outputs is introduced. It is shown that the core of the firm game is non-void whenever the aggregate technology of each coalition exhibits complementarity in outputs and CRS. In the case of \(\alpha \)-returns to scale, the firms have incentive to merge (improvement of technical efficiency) when there are both directional complementarity in inputs and in outputs.

中文翻译：

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具有不变规模收益和$$ \ alpha $$α-规模收益的公司游戏的技术效率

在一种基于具有固定规模收益的投入和产出的广义均值的技术下，企业具有（在企业博弈中）进行合并以提高其技术效率的动机。在输入和输出中引入了方向互补性。结果表明，每一个联盟的综合技术在产出和CRS上都表现出互补性时，企业博弈的核心就是非无效的。在\（\ alpha \）返回规模的情况下，当投入和产出中都存在方向互补时，企业就有动力进行合并（提高技术效率）。