We study default effects in the context of a residential electricity-pricing program. In the large-scale randomized controlled trial we analyse, one treatment group was given the option to opt-in to time-varying pricing while another was defaulted into the program but allowed to opt-out. We provide dramatic evidence of a default effect on program participation, consistent with previous research. A novel feature of our study is that we also observe how the default manipulation impacts customers’ subsequent electricity consumption. Passive consumers who did not opt-out but would not have opted in—comprising more than 70$\%$ of the sample—nonetheless reduce consumption in response to higher prices. Observing of this follow-on behaviour enables us to assess competing explanations for the default effect. We draw conclusions about the likely welfare effects of defaulting customers onto time-varying pricing.

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默认效应和后续行为：来自电力定价计划的证据

我们在住宅电价计划的背景下研究违约效应。在我们分析的大规模随机对照试验中，一个治疗组可以选择加入时变定价，而另一个治疗组默认加入该计划但允许选择退出。我们提供了对项目参与的默认影响的戏剧性证据，与之前的研究一致。我们研究的一个新特点是，我们还观察了默认操作如何影响客户随后的用电量。没有选择退出但不会选择加入的被动消费者——包括超过 70$\%$ 的样本——仍然减少消费以应对更高的价格。观察这种后续行为使我们能够评估默认效果的竞争解释。