Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do and do not enforce noncompetes. Decomposing mobility into job offer generation and acceptance, we detect no evidence of differences in job search, recruitment, or offer activity associated with noncompetes. Rather, we find that employees with noncompetes—even in states that do not enforce them—frequently point to their noncompete as an important reason for declining offers from competitors. Our data further show that these employees’ beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit or legal enforcement are important predictors of their citing a noncompete as a factor in their decision to decline competitor offers.

中文翻译：

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（不可执行）合同的行为效果

合同是否会独立于管辖其可执行性的法律而影响行为？我们使用115,000名劳动力参与者的全国代表性数据，在就业不竞争的情况下探讨了这个问题。我们表明，在不执行和不执行不竞争的两个州中，不竞争与员工流动性的降低和这种流动方向的改变（即朝着不竞争者）相关。将流动性分解为工作机会的产生和接受，我们没有发现证据表明存在与非竞争者相关的工作搜索，招聘或工作机会差异。相反，我们发现具有竞争能力的员工（即使在不执行竞争的国家中）也经常指出其竞争能力不足，这是竞争者拒绝报价的重要原因。