Using a unique employee–establishment survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and their decision-making rights (delegation). We utilize both fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level FE control for management quality, practices, culture, and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited trust in management, and trust of equivalent workers in a different but similar country address the possible endogeneity of employee trust. Across all specifications, we find that delegation to a worker is more likely if that employee trusts management. In our preferred model, which includes establishment FE and accounts for endogeneity, we find a 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in employee trust increases delegation by approximately 0.6 of 1 SD. Our results are robust to the inclusion of worker preferences for individualism (which favors delegation), incentives/bonuses, and alternative measures of decision authority. (JEL D23, L22, L23).

中文翻译：

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员工对管理的信任和组织中的委派

通过使用独特的员工编制调查，我们发现了单个员工对管理层的信任与他们的决策权（委托）之间的因果关系。我们利用固定效应（FE）和工具变量来控制未观察到的因素：企业级别的FE质量管理，实践，文化和其他特征的控制；我们在管理方面的继承信任工具以及在不同但相似的国家/地区中的同等工人的信任关系，解决了员工信任的内生性。在所有规格中，我们发现如果该员工信任管理层，则更有可能委派给该员工。在我们的首选模型中，该模型包括建立FE和说明内生性，我们发现员工信任度每增加1标准差（SD），委托信任度就会增加0.6。我们的结果对于包含工人对个人主义的偏爱（有利于委派），激励/奖金以及决策权限的替代措施是有力的。（JEL D23，L22，L23）。