The proliferation of contracts outsourcing military functions to private companies raises serious oversight concerns vis-à-vis regulation and accountability. As the industry is emerging, regulation of these outsourced function is considered weak. While critics predict an unchecked industry, supporters have defended the lack of an adequate accountability mechanism by touting self-regulation as a potential solution. Following this discussion, we examine whether the frequency of contractor violations and legal repercussions within the overall contracting industry differed between those in the burgeoning security-contracting community and those in the traditional contracting community. We utilize a preexisting dataset of American contractors’ misconduct to compare military contacting to non-military contracting and military contractors to non-military contractors. Our results indicate that contracting military functions is associated with higher levels of violations and lower levels of legal repercussions, while military contractor companies themselves are not associated with higher levels of violations or legal repercussion. These findings support calls for improved oversight of conflict area’s contracting in order to prevent contractors’ misconduct with impunity.

将军事职能外包给私营公司的合同激增，引起了对法规和问责制的严重监督关注。随着行业的兴起，对这些外包功能的监管被认为是薄弱的。尽管批评家们预测行业将不受制衡，但支持者通过吹捧自我监管作为一种潜在的解决方案，为缺乏适当的问责机制辩护。在进行了讨论之后，我们研究了在整个承包商行业中承包商违规和法律影响的发生率在新兴的安全承包商社区和传统承包商社区之间是否有所不同。我们利用美国承包商违规行为的现有数据集，将军事接触与非军事承包商联系起来，将军事承包商与非军事承包商联系起来。我们的结果表明，承包军事职能与较高级别的违法行为和较低水平的法律影响相关，而军事承包商公司本身与较高级别的违法行为或法律影响无关。这些发现支持呼吁对冲突地区的合同进行更好的监督，以防止承包商的不当行为而不受惩罚。而军事承包商公司本身与更高级别的违规行为或法律后果无关。这些发现支持呼吁对冲突地区的合同进行更好的监督，以防止承包商的不当行为而不受惩罚。而军事承包商公司本身与更高级别的违规行为或法律后果无关。这些发现支持呼吁对冲突地区的合同进行更好的监督，以防止承包商的不当行为而不受惩罚。