Is disgust morally valuable? The answer to that question turns, in large part, on what we can do to shape disgust for the better. But this cultivation question has received surprisingly little attention in philosophical debates. To address this deficiency, this article examines empirical work on disgust and emotion regulation. This research reveals that while we can exert some control over how we experience disgust, there’s little we can do to substantively change it at a more fundamental level. These empirical insights have revisionary implications both for debates about disgust’s moral value and for our understanding of agency and moral development more generally.

厌恶在道德上有价值吗？这个问题的答案在很大程度上取决于我们可以做些什么来使厌恶状况变得更好。但是在哲学辩论中，这个修养问题却很少受到关注。为了解决这一不足，本文研究了关于厌恶和情绪调节的实证研究。这项研究表明，尽管我们可以控制自己的厌恶方式，但我们几乎无能为力地从根本上改变它。这些经验性的见解对于有关厌恶的道德价值的辩论，以及对于我们更普遍地对代理和道德发展的理解，都具有修订意义。